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Abstract 
This paper examines the export promotion of processed foods by a regional economy and 
regional vitalisation policy. We employ Bertrand models that contain a major home 
producer and a home producer in a local area. In our model, growth in the profit of one 
producer does not result in an increase in the profit of the other, despite strategic 
complements. We show that the profit of the producer in the local area decreases because 
of the deterioration of a location condition, and its profit increases through the 
reinforcement of the administrative guidance. Furthermore, when the inefficiency of the 
location worsens, the local government should optimally decrease the level of 
administrative guidance. Hence, the local government should strategically eliminate this 
inefficiency to maintain a sufficient effect of administrative guidance. 
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1. Introduction 
Discussions have been increasing on the decline of regional economies and disparities 
between urban areas and regional areas in many countries, for example, as mentioned 
in Breinlich et al. (2013), the deterioration of Detroit, disparity between the northern 
and southern areas in the United Kingdom and Italy, overconcentration of the population 
in metropolitan areas in Japan, disparity between coastal areas and inland areas in 
China, and regional disparities in India and Brazil. Although the decline of regional 
economies shall also be regarded as an adjustment or natural consequence of rational 
accumulation in the field of economics, the restructuring or developing of regional 
economies is an issue for policymakers. 
For the vitalisation of regional economies, producing and exporting food products 
from regional areas is considered an anticipated method because food is a necessity, and 
the interest in food safety and quality and health awareness is increasing worldwide. 
Walker(2016) argues that Detroit uses urban food production as an environmental 
justification and that Vancouver is attempting to win its international reputation as a 
cosmopolitan green city by using urban agriculture. Additionally, foods that attract 
vegetarians and vegans are receiving increasing attention in the market. Moreover, the 
cost of international transportation has decreased, tariffs on products have been 
removed in the long run, and intra-industry trade has recently increased. These reasons 
are why the discussion of how to derive a further benefit from foreign food markets is a 
critical research topic. For instance, the Norwegian aquaculture industry successfully 
exports farmed salmon. Liu et al. (2011) explain that Norwegian salmon aquaculture is 
governed by the public sector and that the purpose of the policy is developed from 
regional vitalisation to active advancements overseas.  
We consider these matters in our attempt to provide theoretical insights into how 
producers and governments in local areas vitalise regional economies through the 
production and export of food and agricultural processed products. In the field of the 
theory of international trade, oligopoly models have frequently been adopted to study 
export strategies. Brander and Spencer(1985) provide a typical example of models of 
strategic trade policy and suppose that the producers compete in a Cournot fashion. With 
respect to Brander and Spencer(1985) and allied Cournot models, an export subsidy 
shifts the profit of the foreign producer towards the home producer and can improve the 
welfare of the home country. Contrary to those results in Cournot competition, Eaton 
and Grossman(1986) adopt the Bertrand paradigm and show that an export tax improves 
the home producer’s profit and national welfare, instead of the export subsidy.  
However, the problem is that an export subsidy or an export tax is inconsistent with 
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the spirit of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and difficult to implement these days. 
For example, restraining export subsidies and policies that have equal effects in the 
agriculture sector have become a target in the agreement reached at the “Bali Package” 
in December 2013 (WTO, 2013), and nowadays, WTO members are moving forward with 
further regulation of fisheries subsidies (WTO, 2019). Hence, this paper models 
administrative guidance by the local government as a realistic export policy that does 
not contradict the spirit of the WTO, analyses the properties of the optimal policy, and 
discusses the impact of the policy on regional economies.  
For that purpose, we develop oligopoly models in which two food producers, a 
producer located in an urban area, and a producer located in a local area export food 
products of the same type to a foreign country. For the producer located in the local area, 
the inefficiency due to its decentralised location is a major operational disadvantage, for 
example, the outflow of highly skilled human resources to urban areas. Accordingly, the 
producer in the local area requires a peculiar advantage to compete with other producers 
and increases corporate income. Thus, we assume that the producer in the local area 
that has such inefficiency can overcome it by adding new value to its food, and competes 
with the producer in the urban area, which denotes that both types of foods are imperfect 
substitutes.  
In an oligopoly market where products are differentiated, the appropriate and 
realistic variable as the producers’ strategy is considered the price rather than the 
output; therefore, we examine a third market model of Bertrand competition, as in Eaton 
and Grossman(1986). Notably, Eaton and Grossman(1986) reveal that when the 
equilibrium prices increase by imposing an export tax and politically shifting the home 
producer’s reaction curve, the profit of foreign producer also increases, and an increase 
in prices leads to a decrease in demand for the home product and shrinkage in consumer 
surplus.  
This paper develops non-specific and specific models to provide results with high 
robustness and concrete results. Our models differ from Eaton and Grossman(1986) as 
follows: the two producers in competition with each other are located in the same home 
country, and the adopted policy is not an export subsidy or an export tax but the 
administrative guidance by the local government, which reduces the production cost and 
improves the export strategies of the producer in the local area.  
In our models, the location becoming inefficient and improvement in added value 
increase the production cost for the producer. Hence, from the consequences of Eaton and 
Grossman(1986), we deduce that such factors act the same as an export tax; consequently, 
the prices increase and both producers gain from those changes, because of strategic 
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complements. Regarding the effects of the administrative guidance, we presume that a 
reduction in the production cost acts the same as an export subsidy, causing a decrease 
in prices and profit shrinkage while both producers gain from the improvement of the 
export strategies. However, these deductions do not necessarily correspond to our results.  
First, the analysis of our models indicates that the deterioration in the location 
condition of the local area causes the price of food produced in any area to increase. By 
specifying the functions of the model, we show that the demand for food produced in the 
local area and consumer surplus shrink with this price hike, which corresponds to the 
results of Eaton and Grossman(1986). Second, a cost increase due to the inefficient 
location reduces the profit of the producer in the local area in our specific model, which 
is contrary to the result of Eaton and Grossman(1986). Third, although the effects of the 
improvement of added value and the strengthening of the administrative guidance on 
the prices depend on the structures of the demand and cost and are basically 
indeterminate, the specific model clarifies that the producer in the local area gains from 
the strengthening of such policy intervention. 
Further, the specific model shows that because of the location becoming inefficient, 
the effect of increasing the profit by the policy shrinks, and as a consequence, the 
optimal level of the policy falls to balance the cost for the local government with the 
profit in the local area. This result leads us to presume that implementation of the 
administrative guidance at a certain degree of cost should be accompanied by the 
elimination of the inefficiency of the location; otherwise, this policy intervention would 
have failed, simply wasted cost, and in the long term, it decayed and vanished.  
   In addition to the aforementioned studies, this paper is related to the following 
theoretical literature of strategic trade policy or price competition: Youssef and 
Abderrazak(2009), Crespi and Marette(2001), Bastos et al. (2013), Okimoto(2015), 
Qui(1994), and Miller and Pazgal(2005). Blecha and Leitner(2014) and Horst et al. 
(2017) have conducted surveys on urban agriculture. Asche et al. (2019) explore food 
price in a gravity model. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
theoretical models of food demand and production in the Bertrand paradigm. Section 3 
presents the reaction functions of producers, and Section 4 analyses the properties of the 
Bertrand Nash equilibrium. Section 5 develops the game of the first stage, in which the 
local government sets the optimal administrative guidance for the vitalisation of regional 
economies and discusses the implication of the policy intervention. Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Models of food exports from the local area 
We consider two food producers that operate in the same home country: a major food 
producer in an urban area (producer U) and a small or medium-sized producer located 
in a local area (producer L). Both produce and export food products of the same type to 
country X, in which many consumers exist. Producer L is inefficient due to its location, 
which leads to the disadvantage, for example, difficulty securing human resources, with 
𝑐̅𝐿  as the unit cost caused by the inefficiency. Producer L also has the advantage of 
having the technology particular to the local area, for instance, traditional or modern 
and advanced technology.  
Such a technique of producer L for adding new value to its food (food L) can 
differentiate food L from the food of producer U (food U), enabling producer L to develop 
foods favoured by consumers in country X. We let 𝑅  be the added value per unit. 
However, the added value is no guarantee of success. Due to insufficient information on 
the sense of taste and the extent of the health consciousness in country X, the developed 
food L may not sell. 𝑃(𝐺) is the probability that food L suits the tastes of consumers in 
country X; 𝐺 denotes the level of administrative guidance of the local government to 
make producer L operate more efficiently; hence, 𝑃′(𝐺) > 0. 
 
2.1. A model of a non-specific framework 
Considering the aforementioned, we define the non-specific demand function of food 
𝑗 in country X as 𝑋𝑗(𝑝𝑈, 𝑝𝐿; 𝑅, 𝐺), where (i) 
𝜕𝑋𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑗
< 0, 
𝜕𝑋𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑘
> 0, 𝑗, 𝑘 = 𝑈, 𝐿, and 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘, and 
(ii) 
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑡
< 0, 
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑡
> 0, and 𝑡 = 𝑅, 𝐺. 𝑝𝑗  (𝑝𝑘 ) denotes the price of food 𝑗 (𝑘). Under the 
Bertrand competition, producer 𝑗 chooses the price of food 𝑗 to maximise its profit: 
 
   𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝𝑗
𝜋𝑗 = (𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗)𝑋𝑗  𝑗 = 𝑈, 𝐿, 
 
where 𝜋𝑗 denotes the profit and 𝑐𝑗 is the unit cost of producer 𝑗. We assume that 𝑐𝑈 
is positive and constant. 𝑐𝐿 is the function that satisfies 
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
> 0, 
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑅
> 0, and 
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝐺
< 0. 
 
2.2. A model of a specific framework 
Next, we specify the functional form and obtain a demand function that is easy to 
handle. First, we let 𝜃𝑖 be the extent of consumer 𝑖’ s preference for the added value, 𝑅. 
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According to 𝜃𝑖, consumers are uniformly distributed over [0,1]. When the added value 
suits the tastes of consumers, the higher 𝜃𝑖, the more consumer 𝑖 prefers the added 
value. By contrast, when they are not concerned with the added value, 𝜃𝑖 = 0 holds for 
all consumers. Because food U has no added value (𝑅 = 0), the utility of consumer 𝑖 
obtained from one unit of food is summarised as follows:  
 
           𝑢𝑖 = {
√𝑞 + 𝑅𝜃𝑖                  𝑖𝑓  𝑅 > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝜃𝑖 ≠ 0 
 √𝑞              𝑖𝑓  𝑅 = 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑/𝑜𝑟  𝜃𝑖 = 0 
, 
 
where 𝑞 is the basic utility of food that is common to two types of food; the concavity of  
the basic utility function, √𝑞, shows the risk aversion of each consumer.  
Now, we can define the utility of consumer 𝑖 obtained from one unit of food 𝑗 :  
 
𝑢𝑖
𝑈 = √𝑞, 
𝑢𝑖
𝐿 = 𝑃(𝐺)(√𝑞 + 𝑅𝜃𝑖) + (1 − 𝑃(𝐺))√𝑞. 
 
Given our utility specification, consumer surpluses by purchasing food U and food L for 
consumer 𝑖 with 𝜃𝑖 are, respectively,  
  
   𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝑈 = √𝑞 − 𝑝𝑈 , 
              𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝐿 = 𝑃(𝐺)(√𝑞 + 𝑅𝜃𝑖) + (1 − 𝑃(𝐺))√𝑞 − 𝑝
𝐿 . 
 
Comparing two levels of consumer surplus, consumer 𝑖 chooses food U or food L and 
purchases at most one food 𝑗. However, consumer 𝑖 has an incentive to purchase food 𝑗  
only when he/she obtains a non-negative consumer surplus by purchasing food 𝑗  (𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝑗 ≥
0). For simplicity, we make 
 
Condition 1 𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝑈 > 0 ⇔ √𝑞 > 𝑝𝑈 . 
 
Condition 1 implies that all consumers can obtain a positive consumer surplus from 
food U. With respect to food L, 𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝐿 ≥ 0 ⇔ 𝜃𝑖 ≥
𝑝𝐿−√𝑞
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
 leads to the threshold that the 
incentive to purchase food L vanishes as 𝜃𝑖
∗ ≡
𝑝𝐿−√𝑞
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
. Here, we set 
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Condition 2 𝜃𝑖
∗ > 0 ⇔ 𝑝𝐿 > √𝑞 . 
 
Condition 2 implies that some consumers have no incentive to purchase food L.  
Conditions 1 and 2 yield 𝑝𝐿 > 𝑝𝑈. 𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝑈 ⋛ 𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝐿 ⇔ 𝜃𝑖 ⋚
𝑝𝐿−𝑝𝑈
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
 leads to the threshold of 
demand as 𝜃𝑖
∗∗ ≡
𝑝𝐿−𝑝𝑈
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
. Therefore, we find that 𝜃𝑖
∗∗ > 𝜃𝑖
∗ > 0. Additionally, we make  
 
Condition 3 1 > 𝜃𝑖
∗∗ ⇔ 𝑃(𝐺)𝑅 > 𝑝𝐿 − 𝑝𝑈. 
 
Condition 3 implies that some consumers purchase food L. Notably, condition 3 is not 
necessarily true of the real economy but is necessary to analyse the market where both 
types of food are consumed. This specified preference structure leads to the following 
demand functions: 
  
   𝑋𝑈 = 𝜃𝑖
∗∗ =
𝑝𝐿 − 𝑝𝑈
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
, 
   𝑋𝐿 = 1 − 𝜃𝑖
∗∗ = 1 −
𝑝𝐿 − 𝑝𝑈
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
. 
 
 
Figure 1 Threshold of demand over the preference for the added value. 
 
We define the unit costs of producer U and producer L as 𝑐𝑈 = 𝑐̅ and 𝑐𝐿 = 𝑐̅ + 𝑐̅𝐿 +
𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺), respectively. 𝑐̅ is the basic unit cost. 𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺) is the additional unit cost which 
provides the added value where 
∂𝛼
∂𝑅
> 0  and 
∂𝛼
∂𝐺
< 0 . In the Bertrand paradigm, 
producers choose prices to maximise their profit: 
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   𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝𝑈
𝜋𝑈 = (𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈)𝑋𝑈 = (𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐̅)
𝑝𝐿 − 𝑝𝑈
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
, 
             𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝𝐿
𝜋𝐿 = (𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿)𝑋𝐿 = [𝑝𝐿 − (𝑐̅ + 𝑐̅𝐿 + 𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺))] (1 −
𝑝𝐿 − 𝑝𝑈
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
). 
 
3. Stability condition and iso-profit curves under Bertrand competition 
   To indicate variables of the Bertrand Nash equilibrium, the subscript “E” is used. 
 
3.1. Non-specific model 
In the non-specific model, the first-order condition of producer 𝑗 is  
 
   
𝜕𝜋𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑗
=
𝜕𝑋𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑗
(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑐𝑗) + 𝑋𝑗 = 0  𝑗 = 𝑈, 𝐿.      
 
Define 𝐽, 𝑷, 𝑪, 𝑹, and 𝑮 as 𝐽 ≡ [
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
2
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝜕𝑝𝐿
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝜕𝑝𝑈
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
2
], 𝑷 ≡ [𝑝𝑈 𝑝𝐿]𝑡 , 𝑪 ≡ [
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
]
𝑡
, 
𝑹 ≡ [
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝜕𝑅
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝜕𝑅
]
𝑡
, and 𝑮 ≡ [
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝜕𝐺
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝜕𝐺
]
𝑡
. Differentiate the first-order conditions 
and use these matrix and vectors to provide the properties of food prices in the 
equilibrium: 
 
   𝐽𝑑𝑷 = −𝑪𝑑𝑐̅𝐿 − 𝑹𝑑𝑅 − 𝑮𝑑𝐺.                                         (1) 
 
We assume the second-order conditions are satisfied, that is,
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
2 < 0 and 
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
2 < 0. 
Next, we assume that the food prices adjust with time according to the conditions, 
?̇?𝑈 = 𝑘𝑈(𝑝𝑈𝐸 − 𝑝𝑈) and ?̇?𝐿 = 𝑘𝐿(𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑝𝐿); a “dot” represents the change in a variable 
according to time. We let 𝑍 be the variable which denotes a sort of distance from the 
equilibrium and define 2𝑍 = 𝑘𝑈(𝑝𝑈𝐸 − 𝑝𝑈)2 + 𝑘𝐿(𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑝𝐿)2 . Under the adjustment 
processes according to time and the reaction functions, the stability condition of the 
equilibrium is equal to the condition which makes 𝑍 become a Liapunov function under 
Bertrand competition:1 
 
1 Based on the ideas of global stability using a Liapunov function, Wong(1995) shows the 
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Condition 4 (Stability condition)      0 < 𝑎 < −𝑏      𝑎𝑛𝑑        0 < 𝑐 < −𝑑, 
 
where 𝑎 ≡
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+
𝜕2𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝜕𝑝𝐿
(𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈) , 𝑏 ≡
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+
𝜕2𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
2 (𝑝
𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈) , 𝑐 ≡
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+
𝜕2𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝜕𝑝𝑈
(𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿) , 
and 𝑑 ≡
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+
𝜕2𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
2 (𝑝
𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿) (see Appendix A). Using condition 4 and 
𝜕𝑋𝑗
𝜕𝑝𝑗
< 0, we find 
that |𝐽| = (𝑏 +
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
) (𝑑 +
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
) − 𝑎𝑐 > 0. 
The relationship of the slopes of reaction functions is  
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
|
𝐿
−
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
|
𝑈
=
(𝑏+
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
)(𝑑+
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
)−𝑎𝑐
−𝑐(𝑏+
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
)
> 0 , with  
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
|
𝑈
=
−𝑎
𝑏+
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
> 0   and  
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
|
𝐿
=
−(𝑑+
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
)
𝑐
> 0  being the 
slopes of the reaction functions of producer U and producer L, respectively. With respect 
to producer U, the total differential, 𝑑𝜋𝑈 = 0, leads to the slope of its iso-profit curve as 
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑝𝑈
= −
𝑋𝑈+(𝑝𝑈−𝑐𝑈)
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
(𝑝𝑈−𝑐𝑈)
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝐿
 and the total differential of 𝜋𝑈  where  𝑑𝑝𝑈 = 0  yields 
𝑑𝜋𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
=
(𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈)
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝐿
> 0 . Similarly, the properties of the iso-profit curve of producer L are 
obtained as 
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
= −
𝑋𝐿+(𝑝𝐿−𝑐𝐿)
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
(𝑝𝐿−𝑐𝐿)
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝑈
 and 
𝑑𝜋𝐿
𝑑𝑝𝑈
= (𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿)
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝑈
> 0. For simplicity, we assume 
𝑑2𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑝𝑈
2 > 0 and 
𝑑2𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
2 > 0, based on the ordinary Bertrand model(Appendix B). Under these 
assumptions, the iso-profit curves of producer U are convex towards the left side, and 
the profit becomes higher as the curve is located on the right side more in the figure with 
the set 𝑝𝑈 as the ordinate. By contrast, the iso-profit curves of producer L are convex 
downward, and the profit becomes higher as the curve is more upward in that figure. 
 
 
conditions for stability of the Bertrand Nash equilibrium under the non-specified demand 
functions as given by Eaton and Grossman(1986). We use the stability conditions in 
Wong(1995); notably, these two stability conditions, respectively, correspond to the cases of 
strategic complements and strategic substitutes; our stability condition corresponds to the 
former. 
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3.2. Specific model 
In the specific model, the first-order conditions are 
 
   
𝜕𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
= 0 ⇔ 𝑝𝑈 =
1
2
(𝑝𝐿 + 𝑐̅),                        (2𝑎)      
   
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
= 0 ⇔ 𝑝𝐿 =
1
2
[𝑃(𝐺)𝑅 + 𝑝𝑈 + (𝑐̅ + 𝑐̅𝐿 + 𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺))].                                           (2𝑏)      
 
These conditions lead to equilibrium prices, 𝑝𝑈𝐸 =
1
3
(𝑃(𝐺)𝑅 + 𝑐̅𝐿 + 𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺)) + 𝑐̅  and 
𝑝𝐿𝐸 =
2
3
(𝑃(𝐺)𝑅 + 𝑐̅𝐿 + 𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺)) + 𝑐̅. In this case, we obtain 
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
2 < 0 and 
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
2 < 0. 
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
|
𝐿
=
2 >
1
2
=
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
|
𝑈
 enables the stability condition according to the reaction functions to hold. 
Additionally, the adjustment process according to time always remains stable (Appendix 
A), and with the set 𝑝𝑈 as the ordinate, the iso-profit curves of producer U are convex 
towards the left ( 
𝑑2𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑝𝑈
2 =
2𝑃(𝐺)𝑅𝜋𝑈
(𝑝𝑈−𝑐)̅3
> 0), and the profit becomes higher as the curve is more 
right. Similarly, the iso-profit curves of producer L are convex downwards (  
𝑑2𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
2 =
2𝑃(𝐺)𝑅𝜋𝐿
(𝑝𝐿−𝑐𝐿)3
> 0), and the profit becomes higher as the curve is more upwards.  
 
Figure 2 Reaction curves and iso-profit curves of the ordinary Bertrand model. 
11 
 
4. Comparative statics of the second stage 
 
4.1. Equilibrium prices 
First, the results with respect to 𝑐̅𝐿 obtained by Eq.(1) in the non-specific model are 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
1
|𝐽|
(𝑏 +
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
)
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
>
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
= −
1
|𝐽|
𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
> 0  because  −𝑏 > 𝑎 . Eqs.  (2)  in the 
specific model also leads to  
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
>
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
> 0. Hence, we find 
 
Proposition 1. An increase in the price of food produced in the local area is greater than 
an increase in the price of food produced in the urban area, as the inefficiency of the 
location in a local area worsens.  
 
Clearly, the propagation of an increase in 𝑝𝐿 to 𝑝𝑈 occurs through a positive indirect 
effect behind Proposition 1 because the direct effects common to both models are 
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑐̅𝐿
|
𝑈
=
0 and 
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑐̅𝐿
|
𝐿
> 0. This finding implies that the inconvenient location of producers in the 
local area causes a nationwide hike in the price of food because of strategic complements. 
 
 
3-1 An ordinary case 
 
3-2 The specific model
Figure 3 Change in the inefficiency of the location. 
 
Second, the results with respect to 𝑅  and 𝐺  in the non-specific model are 
indeterminate and summarised as follows: 
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   |𝐽|
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑡
≈ − [
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑡
(𝑑 +
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
) − 𝑎 (−
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑡
+
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑡
)]   𝑡 = 𝑅, 𝐺, 
   |𝐽|
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑡
≈ −(𝑏 +
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
)(−
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑡
+
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑡
) +
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑡
𝑐   𝑡 = 𝑅, 𝐺, 
 
where these approximations assume that 
𝜕2𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝜕𝑡
 and 
𝜕2𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝜕𝑡
 are sufficiently small 
(Appendix C). Therefore, we obtain 
 
   sign(
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑡
) ≈ sign [− |
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
2| |
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑡
| +
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝜕𝑝𝐿
(|
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
|
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑡
+
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑡
)] ,           (3𝑎) 
   sign(
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑡
) ≈ sign [|
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
2| (|
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
|
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑡
+
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑡
) −
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝜕𝑝𝑈
 |
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑡
|] .           (3𝑏) 
 
We assume that |
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
2|, |
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
2|, 
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝜕𝑝𝐿
 and 
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝜕𝑝𝑈
 2 are also sufficiently small.  
Utilising the assumption that 
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑅
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑅
> 0, we interpret Eqs. (3) when 𝑡 =
𝑅 ; as far as influences such that 
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑅
> 0 , 
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑅
> 0 , and 
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
< 0  on producer L are 
(respectively, influence such that 
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑅
< 0  on producer U is) so large, 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑅
> 0  and 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑅
> 0  (respectively,  
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑅
< 0  and 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑅
< 0 ) in the non-specific model. By contrast, 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑅
>
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑅
> 0 is obtained in the specific model. These lead to 
 
Proposition 2. An improvement in the added value of food produced in the local area 
causes food price increases if increases in the demand for and production cost for the food 
produced in the local area, and gross self-substitution effect of that are large. 
 
Eq.  (1)  shows that we have 
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑅
|
𝑈
≈
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑅
−
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
2
< 0  and 
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑅
|
𝐿
≈
−
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑅
+
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑅
−
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
2
> 0  as the 
 
2 0 < 𝑎 and 0 < 𝑐 are assumed in condition 4, where 𝑎 ≡
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝜕𝑝𝐿
 and 𝑐 ≡
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝜕𝑝𝑈
. 
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approximate direct effects in the non-specific model (Figure 4). Likewise, Eqs. (2) 
indicate that 
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑅
|
𝑈
= 0 and 
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑅
|
𝐿
> 0 are the direct effects in the specific model as in 
Figure 3. We consider these matters and presume that whether the equilibrium prices 
increase depends on the magnitude correlation between such a 𝑝𝐿  increase and 𝑝𝑈 
decrease or invariance as the direct effect, because the strategies of the producers are 
complementary.3  
 
4-1  High reaction of Producer L 
( 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑅
> 0 and 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑅
> 0)  
 
4-2  High reaction of Producer U 
( 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑅
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑅
< 0) 
Figure 4 Change in the added value in the non-specific model. 
 
Here, we utilize the assumption that 
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝐺
< 0  and 
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝐺
> 0  to interpret Eqs.  (3) 
when 𝑡 = 𝐺 ; as far as 
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝐺
< 0 , 
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝐺
< 0 , and 
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
< 0  are (respectively,  
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝐺
> 0  is) 
sufficiently large, that  
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
< 0 (respectively,  
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
> 0 and 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
> 0). We 
obtain a similar result, namely, sign (
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
) = sign (
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
) = sign (𝑃′(𝐺)𝑅 +
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
) , in the 
specific model. These provide 
 
 
 
3 Since the conditions that lead  
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑅
> 0 and 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑅
> 0 are the same quality, two prices 
tend to move in a parallel direction (Figure 4).  
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Proposition 3. An increase in the level of administrative guidance causes a decrease in 
food prices if a decrease in the demand for the food produced in the urban area and effect 
of the cost reduction and gross self-substitution effect of the food produced in the local 
area are large. 
 
Compared with Eqs.  (3)  when 𝑡 = 𝑅 , the factor of the price increase is reduced in 
Eqs. (3) when 𝑡 = 𝐺: the administrative guidance relatively hardly causes a food price 
hike. This difference results from the indefiniteness of the direct effect of 𝐺  on 𝑝𝐿 
because of the cost reduction effect (
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝐺
< 0 and 
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
< 0), in contrast to the positive direct 
effect of 𝑅 on 𝑝𝐿: 
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝐺
|
𝐿
≈
−
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝐺
−
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
2
 in the non-specific case and 
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝐺
|
𝐿
=
1
2
(𝑃′(𝐺)𝑅 +
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
) 
in the specific case. Thus, a sufficient cost reduction through the promotion of local 
industry leads to an avoidance of a price hike. Figure 4 analogises the case of 
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝐺
|
𝐿
> 0, 
and Figure 5 illustrates the case of 
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝐺
|
𝐿
< 0.4 Provided that 
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝐺
|
𝑈
≈
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝐺
−
𝜕2𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
2
< 0 in the 
non-specific case and that 
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝐺
|
𝑈
= 0 in the specific case have the same quality as those 
of 𝑅. 
 
5-1  The specific model  
 
5-2 The non-specific model 
Figure 5 Change in administrative guidance: In the case of price decreases. 
 
 
4 The iso-profit curves in Figure 5-2 are standard but not necessarily true. 
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4.2. Equilibrium demands, consumer surpluses, and profit levels 
The non-specific model is of little use to disclose the properties of demands, consumer 
surpluses, and profit levels in the second stage equilibrium. Therefore, we focus on the 
specific model to analyse those properties in this section.  
With respect to 𝑐̅𝐿, we obtain  
𝜕𝑋𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
> 0, 
𝜕𝑋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
< 0, 
𝜕𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
< 0, and 
𝜕𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
< 0: a part of 
demands flow out of food L and into food U, and the foreign consumer surplus shrinks. 
Although the ordinary Bertrand paradigm (Figure 3-1) shows that increasing the 
production cost leads to the increase in equilibrium profits of both producers, our specific 
model shows that the equilibrium profit of producer U increases ( 
𝜕𝜋𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
> 0) and that of 
producer L decreases (
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
< 0) (Figure 3-2).5 
By contrast, the information is insufficient on how the second stage equilibrium is 
affected by 𝑅 : the signs of 
𝜕𝑋𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑅
, 
𝜕𝑋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑅
, 
𝜕𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑅
, 
𝜕𝜋𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑅
, and 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑅
 are indeterminate, and 
𝜕𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑅
< 0, despite the specific model. Regarding 𝐺, we obtain 
𝜕𝑋𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
> 0 in 
that model. Notably, 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
> 0 is obtained even though the signs of 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
 and 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
 are 
ambiguous.6 Unfortunately, the sign of 
𝜕𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
, 
𝜕𝐶𝑆𝑖
𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
, and 
𝜕𝜋𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
 is indeterminate. 
 
5. Local welfare 
In the first stage, the local government chooses the level of 𝐺  to maximise local 
welfare, which is defined as 𝑊 ≡ 𝜋𝐿𝐸 − 𝛽(𝐺). 𝛽(𝐺) denotes the administrative cost and 
𝛽′(𝐺) > 0. As it is difficult to provide a detailed analysis of the first stage by using the 
 
5 
𝜕𝜋𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
𝑝𝐿𝐸−𝑐̅
3𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
> 0. The envelope theorem and 
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
= 0 ⇔ 𝑃(𝐺)𝑅 + 𝑝𝑈 = 2𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿 clarify 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
1
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
[
4
3
𝑝𝐿𝐸 −
1
3
𝑐𝐿 − (𝑃(𝐺)𝑅 + 𝑝𝑈𝐸)] =
−2(𝑝𝐿𝐸−𝑐𝐿)
3𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
< 0. 
6 Obtained by partial differentiation: 
 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
= 𝑃′(𝐺)
𝑝𝐿𝐸−𝑐𝐿
𝑃(𝐺)
(
1
3
+
𝑝𝐿𝐸−𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
) +
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
1
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
[
1
3
(𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑐𝐿) − 𝑃(𝐺)𝑅 + (𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑝𝑈𝐸)]  where the 
condition 
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
= 0 ⇔ 𝑝𝑈 = 2𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿 − 𝑃(𝐺)𝑅  leads to [
1
3
(𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑐𝐿) − 𝑃(𝐺)𝑅 + (𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑝𝑈𝐸)] =
−
2
3
(𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑐𝐿) < 0. 
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non-specific model, hereafter, we use the specific model. Hence, the problem of the local 
government is 
 
   𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐺
𝑊 = 𝜋𝐿𝐸 − 𝛽(𝐺) = [𝑝𝐿𝐸 − (𝑐̅ + 𝑐̅𝐿 + 𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺))] (1 −
𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
) −  𝛽(𝐺). 
 
The first-order condition is 
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝐺
= 0 ⇔
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
= 𝛽′(𝐺) , which provides that the optimal 
administrative guidance balances the increasing profit and increasing administrative 
cost of the local area. The second-order condition is assumed to be satisfied as 
𝜕2𝑊
𝜕𝐺2
≡ 𝜌 <
0. 
As the equilibrium profit of producer L can be written as 𝜋𝐿𝐸 = 𝜋𝐿[𝑝𝑈𝐸(𝐺), 𝑝𝐿𝐸(𝐺), 𝐺] 
and the envelope theorem holds ( 
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
= 0 under 𝑝𝐿 = 𝑝𝐿𝐸), 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
> 0 can be decomposed 
into the direct effect and indirect effect: 
 
   
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
=
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝐺
 
                          =
𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑐𝐿
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
+ (1 −
𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
)(−
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
) +
𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑐𝐿
𝑃(𝐺)
𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
𝑃′(𝐺) > 0. 
 
The aforementioned equation identifies two effects that contribute to the increase in 
𝜋𝐿𝐸: one is 𝑃′(𝐺) and the other is 
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
. However, the effect of 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
 on 𝜋𝐿𝐸 is 
indeterminate.   
We totally differentiate the implicit function expression, 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
= 𝛽′(𝐺), and reveal 
how the optimal administrative guidance, defined as 𝐺𝐸, depends on 𝑐̅𝐿 as  
 
   
𝜕𝐺𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
−1
𝜌
𝜕
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
(
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
− 𝛽′(𝐺)) =
−1
𝜌
𝜕2𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
. 
 
Because 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
, 
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
 and 𝑃′(𝐺) do not depend on 𝑐̅𝐿 , 
𝜕2𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
 can be decomposed into the 
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effects of 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
, 
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
 and 𝑃′(𝐺) as 
 
   
𝜕2𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
𝜕
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
(
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
) 
                            =
𝜕
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
(
𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑐𝐿
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
)
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
+
𝜕
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
(1 −
𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
)(−
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
)
+
𝜕
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
(
𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑐𝐿
𝑃(𝐺)
𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
)𝑃′(𝐺) 
                           =
−1
3𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
+
−1
3𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
(−
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
) +
(𝑝𝑈𝐸 − 𝑐𝐿)
3(𝑃(𝐺))
2
𝑅
𝑃′(𝐺). 
 
Namely, an increase in 𝑐̅𝐿 mitigates the effects of a change in price ( 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝐺
 ) and a cost 
cut ( −
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
> 0 ) on 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
, and how an increase in 𝑐̅𝐿 influences the effect of 𝑃′(𝐺) on 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
 depends on the sign of (𝑝𝑈𝐸 − 𝑐𝐿) and is ambiguous. Furthermore, 
𝜕2𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
 reduces 
to 
 
   
𝜕2𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
1
3𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
[
2
3
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
+
−𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
1
3 +
(𝑝𝑈𝐸 − 𝑐𝐿)
𝑃(𝐺)
𝑃′(𝐺)] < 0. 7 
 
𝜕2𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
< 0 means that as the location becomes inefficient, the additional profit caused by 
the policy intervention, 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
, reduces. That reveals 
𝜕𝐺𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
−1
𝜌
𝜕2𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
< 0 and leads to 
 
Proposition 4. A deterioration in the location condition for the producer in the local 
area leads to a lower level of optimal administrative guidance.  
  
Because a profit increase by 𝐺 ( 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
> 0 ) shrinks because of a higher inefficiency 
 
7 Notably, −𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
1
3
+ (𝑝𝑈𝐸 − 𝑐𝐿) = −
2
3
(𝑐̅𝐿 + 𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺)) < 0 because 𝑝𝑈𝐸 =
1
3
(𝑃(𝐺)𝑅 + 𝑐̅𝐿 +
𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺)) + 𝑐̅ and 𝑐𝐿 = 𝑐̅ + 𝑐̅𝐿 + 𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺). 
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of the location, and a cost increase for 𝐺 (𝛽′(𝐺) > 0) does not depend on this 
inefficiency, Proposition 4 clearly holds to sustain the optimal balance between 
marginal benefit and marginal cost( 
𝜕𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺
= 𝛽′(𝐺)). Proposition 4 is intuitively correct 
and results from 
𝜕2𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
< 0, which is also plausible even though we obtain it by 
specifying the model.  
In contrast with Proposition 4, the effect of the added value on the optimal 
administrative cost is ambiguous, namely, sign (
𝜕𝐺𝐸
𝜕𝑅
) = sign (
𝜕2𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺𝜕𝑅
), and the sign of 
𝜕2𝜋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝐺𝜕𝑅
 
is indeterminate. The added value yields both a benefit and a production cost; thus, 
which of the two effects outweighs the other is indeterminate.  
   
6. Conclusion 
This paper describes export promotion of agricultural processed products with a 
commodity added value or high-quality foods by a regional economy which has a 
disadvantage of decentralised location. We theoretically analyse the impact of the 
inefficiency due to the location, the added value to foods, and the administrative 
guidance by the local government on the regional economy and examine regional 
vitalisation policies.  
Based on Eaton and Grossman(1986), we develop Bertrand-competition models with  
two home producers: a major producer in an urban area and a small or medium-sized 
producer in a local area that produce and export two foods that are imperfect substitutes 
to a particular market outside, and price competition occurs in that market. In our 
models, the producer in the local area has a peculiar technology and adds new value to 
its food to overcome its inefficient location. Such a model has shown that as the 
inefficiency due to the location in the local area worsens, the prices of food produced in 
the local and urban areas increase, a part of demands flows out of food produced in the 
local area into food produced in the urban area, the profit of the producer in the local 
area decreases, and the profit of the producer in the urban area increases.  
These results lead us to presume that the inefficiency due to the location in the local 
area decreases regional economic progress and accelerates the density of producers in 
the urban area. Notably, these results partially differ from the ordinary properties of a 
Bertrand equilibrium shown by Eaton and Grossman(1986) but are intuitively correct: 
the specific model of this paper indicates that an increase in the profit of one producer 
does not result in an increase in the profit of the other, despite the strategic complements 
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under price competition, while the ordinal Bertrand case shows changes in profits in the 
same direction. Hence, the condition with respect to the shapes of iso-profit curves that 
enables government intervention to increase either of the profits should be studied 
further; the findings would contribute to the discussion on appropriate administrative 
guidance. 
Moreover, using the specific model, we find that the profit of the producer in the local 
area always increases due to reinforcement of administrative guidance. We also show 
that when the inefficiency due to the location worsens, the effect of the administrative 
guidance that increases the profit in the local area shrinks, and subsequently, the local 
government decreases the level of administrative guidance to balance marginal profit 
and marginal cost for the local area. Hence, we conclude that when the inefficiency of 
the location worsens, for example, because of a drain of human resources to the urban 
area, the local government must eliminate this inefficiency to provide a sufficient effect 
of administrative guidance that corresponds to its cost, although it may be not as easy 
in practice as in theory; otherwise, the policy becomes ineffective compared with the cost 
incurred, and subsequently, the intervention of the local government can be extinguished 
in the long term. 
Regarding resource allocation, because we suppose a third market model, the 
economic unit who can lose a part of their surplus because of an increase in food prices 
is the consumers in the foreign country. Thus, if we assume that the producers supply 
their food to the home market and consider the result of the second stage, we can surmise 
that a part of the surplus is transferred from home consumers to the producer in the 
local area when an improvement in the producer’s differentiation strategies due to 
administrative guidance causes the price hike. Therefore, the local government should 
be considerate to balance the level of prices and resource allocation when setting 
administrative guidance if consumers are also in the home market.  
One of the limitations of this study is the low robustness of the results in the second 
stage provided by the specific model (Appendix D). Although we suppose that the added 
value is constant for simplicity, further study of the endogenous added value would 
contribute to the field of Bertrand-fashioned strategic trade policy. 
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Appendix A：Stability Conditions  
𝑘𝑈 and 𝑘𝐿 are positive constants. For simplicity, define 𝑦𝑈 ≡ (𝑝𝑈𝐸 − 𝑝𝑈) and 𝑦𝐿 ≡
(𝑝𝐿𝐸 − 𝑝𝐿). Differentiating 𝑍  in the text with respect to time, ?̇? = 𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈(?̇?𝑈𝐸 − ?̇?𝑈) +
𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿(?̇?𝐿𝐸 − ?̇?𝐿) is given as the adjustment processes according to time. This formulation 
builds on the idea of a Liapunov function. If ?̇? < 0 when 𝑍 > 0 (the prices are not the 
equilibrium value) and ?̇? = 0 when 𝑍 = 0 (the prices are the equilibrium value), any 
prices converge to the equilibrium, and then the equilibrium is globally stable. Therefore, 
the condition which leads to ?̇? < 0 when 𝑍 > 0 is the stability condition.   
 
A.1. Non-specific model 
Substituting the adjustment processes according to the reaction functions, ?̇?𝑈𝐸 =
−
𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+𝑏
?̇?𝐿 and ?̇?𝐿𝐸 = −
𝑐
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+𝑑
?̇?𝑈, into ?̇?, we obtain  
   ?̇? = ?̇?𝑈 (−𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈 − 𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿
𝑐
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+ 𝑑
) + ?̇?𝐿 (−𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈
𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+ 𝑏
− 𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿). 
Furthermore, the adjustment processes according to time, ?̇?𝑈 = 𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈 and ?̇?𝐿 = 𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿, 
are substituted for the aforementioned function, which leads to 
   ?̇? = −(𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈)2 − (𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿)2 − 𝑘𝑈𝑘𝐿𝑦𝑈𝑦𝐿 (
𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+ 𝑏
+
𝑐
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+ 𝑑
). 
Thus, the sign of ?̇? depends on the signs of 𝑦𝑈𝑦𝐿, 
𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+𝑏
 and 
𝑐
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+𝑑
.   
We can show that if 0 < 𝑎 < −𝑏 and 0 < 𝑐 < −𝑑, ?̇? < 0 is satisfied. First, 0 < 𝑎 <
−𝑏  ensures 
𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+𝑏
< 0  and |
𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+𝑏
| < 1 . Hence,  0 < −
𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+𝑏
< 1  holds. In the same 
manner, 0 < 𝑐 < −𝑑  ensures 
𝑐
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+𝑑
< 0  and |
𝑐
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+𝑑
| < 1 ; thus, 0 < −
𝑐
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+𝑑
< 1  is 
obtained. These conditions can be then summarised as 
𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+𝑏
+
𝑐
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+𝑑
< 0. Taking this into 
consideration, we find that ?̇? < 0 is clearly ensured when 𝑦𝑈𝑦𝐿 < 0 and  0 < −
𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+𝑏
−
𝑐
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+𝑑
< 2 leads to 
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   ?̇?  = −(𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈)2 − (𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿)2 + 𝑘𝑈𝑘𝐿𝑦𝑈𝑦𝐿 (−
𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+ 𝑏
−
𝑐
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+ 𝑑
) 
       < −(𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈)2 − (𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿)2 + 𝑘𝑈𝑘𝐿𝑦𝑈𝑦𝐿2 = −(𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈 − 𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿)2 ≤ 0, 
 
when 𝑦𝑈𝑦𝐿 > 0. Although the conditions that 0 > 𝑎 > 𝑏 and 0 > 𝑐 > 𝑑 enable ?̇? < 0 to 
hold, these conditions contradict strategic complements in the Bertrand model. 
 
A.2. Specific model 
The adjustment process according to the reaction functions can be represented as 
 ?̇?𝑈𝐸 =
1
2
?̇?𝐿 and ?̇?𝐿𝐸 =
1
2
?̇?𝑈. Substituting those functions and the adjustment processes 
according to time, ?̇?𝑈 = 𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈 and ?̇?𝐿 = 𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿, into ?̇?, we obtain 
   ?̇? = 𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈 (
1
2
?̇?𝐿 − ?̇?𝑈) + 𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿 (
1
2
?̇?𝑈 − ?̇?𝐿) = −(𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈)2 − (𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿)2 + (𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈)(𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿). 
Therefore, if 𝑦𝑈𝑦𝐿 < 0, ?̇? < 0 is ensured and if 𝑦𝑈𝑦𝐿 > 0,  ?̇? < −(𝑘𝑈𝑦𝑈 − 𝑘𝐿𝑦𝐿)2 ≤ 0 is 
ensured, the equilibrium in the specific model is always stable, from the viewpoint of the 
adjustment process according to time.  
 
Appendix B：Slopes of iso-profit curves  
In the non-specific model, a change in the slope of the iso-profit curve of producer U 
is 
   
𝑑
𝑑𝑝𝑈
(
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑝𝑈
) =
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝑈
(
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑝𝑈
) +
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝐿
(
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑝𝑈
)
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑝𝑈
 
      =
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝑈
(
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑝𝑈
) +
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝐿
(
𝑑𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑝𝑈
)
[
 
 
 
−
𝑋𝑈 + (𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈)
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
(𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈)
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝐿 ]
 
 
 
 
      =
1
(𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈)2 (
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝐿
)
3 {−(
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
+ 𝑏) (𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈) (
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝐿
)
2
+ 2𝑎
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝐿
[𝑋𝑈 + (𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈)
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
] − [𝑋𝑈 + (𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈)
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
]
2
𝜕2𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝐿
2 }. 
A change in that of producer L is 
   
𝑑
𝑑𝑝𝐿
(
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
) =
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝐿
(
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
) +
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝑈
(
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
)
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
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      =
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝐿
(
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
) +
𝜕
𝜕𝑝𝑈
(
𝑑𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
)
[
 
 
 
−
𝑋𝐿 + (𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿)
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
(𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿)
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝑈 ]
 
 
 
 
      =
1
(𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿)2 (
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝑈
)
3 {−(
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
+ 𝑑) (𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿)(
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝑈
)
2
+ 2𝑐
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝑈
[𝑋𝐿 + (𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿)
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
] − [𝑋𝐿 + (𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿)
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
]
2
𝜕2𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝑈
2}. 
With respect to those changes in the slopes, the sign of the denominator is positive, the 
sign of the first term in the numerator is also positive, and the signs of second and third 
terms in the numerator are indeterminate. Therefore, we naturally assume that 
𝑑2𝑝𝐿
𝑑𝑝𝑈
2 >
0 and 
𝑑2𝑝𝑈
𝑑𝑝𝐿
2 > 0, as in the text.  
 
Appendix C：Comparative statics 
The results with respect to 𝑡 = 𝑅, 𝐺 are 
   |𝐽|
𝑑𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝑑𝑡
= − [
𝜕2𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝜕𝑡
(𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈) +
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑡
](𝑑 +
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
)     
                  + 𝑎 [
𝜕2𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝜕𝑡
(𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿) −
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑡
+
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑡
], 
   |𝐽|
𝑑𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝑑𝑡
= −(𝑏 +
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
) [
𝜕2𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝜕𝑡
(𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿) −
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
𝜕𝑐𝐿
𝜕𝑡
+
𝜕𝑋𝐿
𝜕𝑡
]                
                    + [
𝜕2𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝜕𝑡
(𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐𝑈) +
𝜕𝑋𝑈
𝜕𝑡
] 𝑐. 
Strictly, 
𝑑𝑝𝑗𝐸
𝑑𝑡
, 𝑗 = 𝑈, 𝐿 should be denoted by 
𝜕𝑝𝑗𝐸
𝜕𝑡
. 
 
Appendix D: Robustness  
We add the assumption that producer L chooses 𝑅 to maximise its profit, to our 
specific model: 
   𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝𝑈
𝜋𝑈 = (𝑝𝑈 − 𝑐̅)
𝑝𝐿 − 𝑝𝑈
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
, 
             𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑝𝐿,𝑅
𝜋𝐿 = [𝑝𝐿 − (𝑐̅ + 𝑐̅𝐿 + 𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺))] (1 −
𝑝𝐿 − 𝑝𝑈
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
). 
These maximisation problems lead to the following reaction functions: 
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𝜕𝜋𝑈
𝜕𝑝𝑈
= 0 ⇔ 𝑝𝑈 =
𝑝𝐿 + 𝑐̅
2
,                                                                        (D. 1) 
   
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
= 0 ⇔ 𝑝𝐿 =
1
2
[𝑃(𝐺)𝑅 + 𝑝𝑈 + (𝑐̅ + 𝑐̅𝐿 + 𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺))],                                           (D. 2) 
   
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑅
= 0 ⇔
𝑝𝐿 − (𝑐̅ + 𝑐̅𝐿 + 𝛼(𝑅, 𝐺))
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
𝑝𝐿 − 𝑝𝑈
𝑅
=
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
(1 −
𝑝𝐿 − 𝑝𝑈
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
).                      (D. 3) 
We assume 
𝜕2𝛼
𝜕𝑅2
= 0 for simplicity. 
𝜕2𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑅2
= −
𝑝𝐿−𝑝𝑈
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅2
[
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
+
2
𝑅
(𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿)] < 0 is ensured. The 
sufficient condition for producer L’s maximum is assumed. 
𝜕𝜋𝐿
𝜕𝑝𝐿
= 0 ⇔
𝑝𝐿−𝑐𝐿
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
= (1 −
𝑝𝐿−𝑝𝑈
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅
) 
implies that Eq.(D. 3) reduces to 
𝑝𝐿−𝑝𝑈
𝑅
=
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
. Thus, we define 
𝑝𝐿−𝑝𝑈
𝑅
=
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
 as Eq.(D. 3)′. We 
totally differentiate Eqs.(D. 1) − (D. 2) and Eq.(D. 3)′ to provide the properties of the 
equilibrium as 
   
[
 
 
 
 
−2 1 0
1 −2 𝑃(𝐺) +
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
−1 1 −
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅 ]
 
 
 
 
𝑑 [
𝑝𝑈
𝑝𝐿
𝑅
] = [
0
−1
0
]𝑑𝑐̅𝐿 +
[
 
 
 
 
0
−(𝑃′(𝐺)𝑅 +
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝐺
)
𝜕2𝛼
𝜕𝑅𝜕𝐺
𝑅 ]
 
 
 
 
𝑑𝐺. 
We define |𝐽| as the Jacobian matrix of the equation. Using Eq.(D. 3)′, |𝐽| is equal to 
𝑃(𝐺) − 2
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
. Thus, the results of the comparative statics, 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
−
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
|𝐽|
 , 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
−2
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
|𝐽|
, and 
𝜕𝑅𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
−1
|𝐽|
, reduce to 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
> 0, 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
> 0, and 
𝜕𝑅𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
> 0 (respectively, 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
< 0, 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑅𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
< 0) if 𝑃(𝐺) < 2
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
 (respectively,  𝑃(𝐺) > 2
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
 ). 
The negative indirect effect, 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑝𝑈
< 0, is considered the cause of indeterminacy of the 
signs of 
𝜕𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
 and 
𝜕𝑝𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
. Eq. (D. 3)′ clarifies that 
𝜕𝑋𝑈𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
1
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅𝐸|𝐽|
(−
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
+
𝑝𝐿𝐸−𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝑅𝐸
) = 0 and 
𝜕𝑋𝐿𝐸
𝜕𝑐̅𝐿
=
1
𝑃(𝐺)𝑅𝐸|𝐽|
(
𝜕𝛼
𝜕𝑅
−
𝑝𝐿𝐸−𝑝𝑈𝐸
𝑅𝐸
) = 0. Those are different from Proposition 1 and the second 
stage equilibrium in the text. Moreover, the amount of information on how the 
equilibrium prices are affected by 𝐺 is insufficient. 
